L1 Week 4: Host Security, Mobile Solutions, Secure Application Concepts, and Cloud Security
Covering host hardening and endpoint protection, mobile device management and deployment models, application attack indicators with secure coding practices, and cloud/virtualization security concepts including deployment and service models, hypervisor types, VDI, containers, and cloud security controls.
Playlist: Security+ 30-42
1. Hardening
Hardening is the process of configuring an OS or application into a secure state. Every feature or service left enabled is a potential attack surface — hardening systematically reduces that surface to the minimum required for the system’s intended function.
The key constraint: hardening must be balanced against usability. Locking down a workstation to server-level security may break legitimate workflows. The intended role of the system always drives the hardening baseline.
2. Patch Management
No software is free of vulnerabilities. The moment a CVE is published, two races start simultaneously: the vendor racing to patch it, and the attacker racing to exploit it. Patch management is the discipline that ensures the vendor wins.
Small/residential networks: hosts are configured for auto-update. This is simple but creates problems at scale — multiple update agents (OS, browser, Java, OEM drivers, AV) running concurrently on the same host cause performance issues and management overhead.
Enterprise networks: use a centralized patch management suite such as Microsoft SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) to:
- Inventory missing patches across the environment using automated vulnerability scanners
- Test patches before deployment
- Push patches on a controlled schedule
- Report compliance status
Scanning for missing patches is useless without the operational procedures to actually apply them. Detection without remediation is just a list of known weaknesses.
3. Endpoint Protection
3.1 Antivirus / Anti-Malware
Antivirus (A-V) originated as signature-based detection of known viruses. Modern A-V products have expanded scope — they detect viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, PUPs (potentially unwanted programs), and cryptojackers. The term “anti-malware” is more accurate for current products.
Critical limitation: signature-based detection cannot catch what it has no signature for. Zero-days, novel malware variants, and fileless attacks bypass A-V entirely. Signature-based detection alone is insufficient to prevent data breaches — it must be layered with behavioral controls.
3.2 Host-Based IDS / IPS (HIDS / HIPS)
HIDS detects threats via log monitoring and file system integrity monitoring. It checks whether managed file images — OS system files, drivers, application executables — have changed from a known-good baseline using cryptographic signatures.
HIDS products may also monitor:
- Active ports and network interfaces
- Process execution data
- Logs from specific applications (HTTP, FTP, etc.)
HIPS is the preventive variant — it takes automated action (block, terminate) rather than just alerting.
3.3 Endpoint Protection Platform (EPP)
Running separate agents for A-V, HIDS, host firewall, and web filtering creates compounding problems: performance degradation, agent conflicts, false positives, and increased support burden.
An EPP consolidates all endpoint security functions into a single agent:
| EPP Function | Description |
|---|---|
| Malware detection/prevention | A-V + behavioral analysis |
| Intrusion detection/prevention | HIDS/HIPS |
| Host firewall | Local traffic filtering |
| Web content filtering | Secure search and browsing enforcement |
| File/message encryption | Data-at-rest and in-transit protection |
| DLP | Data loss prevention (see below) |
3.4 Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
A DLP agent (commonly bundled in EPPs) is configured with policies that define what data is sensitive — credit card numbers, PII, classified document patterns, etc. The agent enforces these policies by:
- Preventing sensitive data from being copied to removable media
- Blocking unauthorized email attachments containing sensitive content
- Alerting on or blocking uploads of tagged files
DLP operates on content inspection, not just file type or destination.
4. Mobile Device Deployment Models
Mobile devices are now primary endpoints for email, calendaring, and cloud application access. How an organization provisions and owns those devices directly determines the attack surface and the organization’s ability to enforce security controls.
| Model | Ownership | Typical Use | Security Control Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) | Employee | Personal device used for work | Lowest — employee may resist MDM enrollment |
| COBO (Corporate Owned, Business Only) | Company | Work use only; no personal apps | Highest — full control |
| COPE (Corporate Owned, Personally-Enabled) | Company | Work device; personal use permitted under AUP | High — device is corporate property |
| CYOD (Choose Your Own Device) | Company | Employee selects from an approved list | High — same as COPE, wider device choice |
Exam tip: BYOD is the most popular model with employees and the hardest to secure. COBO gives the tightest control but lowest employee satisfaction. Know the tradeoff for each.
5. Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM)
EMM is the management framework that applies security policy to mobile devices and applications at scale. It has two main functional pillars:
| Component | Full Name | Scope | Key Capabilities |
|---|---|---|---|
| MDM | Mobile Device Management | The device itself | Authentication policy, feature restrictions (camera, mic), connectivity enforcement, remote wipe, device reset |
| MAM | Mobile Application Management | Applications and data | App allowlist/blocklist, prevent data transfer between corporate and personal apps, enterprise container/workspace isolation |
MDM handles the hardware layer; MAM handles the data layer. Together they implement the enforcement boundary between corporate and personal data on the same device.
6. Mobile Access Control
If a threat actor gains physical access to a smartphone, they inherit access to email, credentials stored in apps, authenticator tokens, and potentially VPN sessions.
Screen lock authentication options:
- Password / PIN
- Swipe pattern
- Biometrics: fingerprint (most common), facial recognition, voice recognition
Lockout policy: escalating lockout after repeated failed attempts deters brute-force. Example: 1st failure → 30 seconds; 3rd failure → 10 minutes; N failures → device wipe.
7. Remote Wipe
A remote wipe (kill switch) allows an administrator or the device owner to trigger a factory reset or data sanitization remotely — over the air — if the device is stolen or lost.
Trigger sources:
- N consecutive incorrect passcode attempts
- MDM/EMM administrator action
- Owner-initiated via device management portal
Additional capabilities some platforms support:
- Back up device data to a server before wiping
- Display a “Lost/stolen — return to [contact]” message on the lock screen
- Wipe removable/plug-in memory cards
Limitation: a sophisticated attacker can prevent a remote wipe by isolating the device from all networks before hacking it. Remote wipe is a control, not a guarantee — encryption provides the underlying protection when wipe is not possible.
8. Full Device Encryption
Modern mobile OSes encrypt storage by default. iOS implements encryption in layers:
| Layer | Key Source | What It Protects | Primary Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base encryption | Key stored on device | All user data | Fast wipe — delete the key, data becomes inaccessible without overwriting every block |
| Data Protection | Key derived from user credential | Email, apps opted in to Data Protection | Protects data if device is stolen and passcode is unknown |
Note: not all iOS data uses Data Protection. Contacts, SMS messages, and photos are excluded by default.
9. Location Services
Geolocation identifies a device’s physical position using one or both of:
| System | Mechanism | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| GPS | Satellite signals via GPS sensor | Outdoor positioning; high accuracy |
| IPS (Indoor Positioning System) | Triangulation from cell towers, Wi-Fi APs, Bluetooth/RFID beacons | Indoor positioning where GPS signal is weak |
Location services is available to any app the user has granted permission to — which itself is an attack surface. Malicious apps can silently track location if permissions are not carefully reviewed.
10. Rooting and Jailbreaking
Mobile OSes, like desktop OSes, run the owner’s session under a restricted account — not the root/kernel account. Vendors, OEMs, and carriers use this to enforce restrictions on what software can be installed and how the device can be configured. Users who want to bypass these restrictions must escalate privileges.
| Technique | Platform | Method | What It Enables |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rooting | Android | Exploit vulnerability or flash custom firmware (custom ROM) | Root account access; install unauthorized apps (sideloading); modify system files |
| Jailbreaking | iOS | Boot with a patched kernel (typically tethered — requires PC connection on boot) | Root access; sideload apps; change carriers; UI customization |
| Carrier unlocking | iOS / Android | Remove carrier restrictions | Use device on any carrier |
Security implications of rooting/jailbreaking:
- Bypasses OS security model — malware can run with root privileges
- Removes vendor security patches from the standard update path (custom ROMs may lag)
- MDM enrollment and corporate app policies may be circumvented
- Remote wipe may be disabled
Exam tip: jailbreaking is an iOS term; rooting is Android. Both achieve the same outcome — privilege escalation on the device — but the mechanisms differ. Tethered jailbreak = requires a connected PC to boot the patched kernel.
11. Application Attack Indicators
Application attacks target vulnerabilities in OS or application software to achieve arbitrary code execution — running attacker-controlled code within the context of a trusted process. The goal is typically a foothold or lateral movement.
Arbitrary code execution: attacker runs their own code on the system. Remote code execution (RCE): the malicious code is delivered from a remote machine.
The simplest observable indicator of an application attack is privilege escalation — a process suddenly operating at a higher privilege level than it was designed to use.
11.1 Error Handling
A crash or unhandled exception is often a signal that an attack was attempted (even if unsuccessful). Dangerous behavior: unhandled exceptions on web apps that expose platform details in the error page — database type, version, stack trace — giving attackers reconnaissance data for the next attempt.
Windows error indicators: “Instruction could not be read or written,” “Undefined exception,” “Process has encountered a problem.”
11.2 Improper Input Handling
Most application attacks work by passing maliciously constructed input to a vulnerable process. Input validation failure is the root cause of two major attack families: overflow attacks and injection attacks.
12. Overflow Vulnerabilities
12.1 Buffer Overflow
A buffer is a reserved memory area for expected data. In a buffer overflow, the attacker submits input larger than the buffer can hold, overwriting adjacent memory.
Stack overflow — the most common variant:
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Normal Execution:
Main() Stack
Main()
Return Address ──► back to Main()
Sub() Stack
Sub()
Exploit Execution:
Main() Stack
Main()
Return Address ──► redirected to shellcode
NOP ← NOP sled (attacker-controlled)
NOP
Shellcode ← attacker's payload
NOP
Sub()
The attacker overfills the Sub() stack buffer, overwrites the return address with a pointer into the NOP sled, and when Sub() returns, execution flows into the shellcode instead of back to Main().
Detection indicators: unexplained crashes or error messages after a file download, execution of a new app/script, or connection of new hardware.
12.2 Memory Leaks and Resource Exhaustion
When a process no longer needs memory, it should release it. A memory leak occurs when it does not — memory is consumed indefinitely and never returned to the OS.
Impact: reduced available memory for other processes; eventual system instability or crash.
Highest severity: memory leaks in background services (run indefinitely) and OS kernel (no containment).
A memory leak may itself be an indicator of a malicious or corrupted process consuming resources intentionally (resource exhaustion as a DoS vector).
13. DLL Injection
A DLL (Dynamic Link Library) is a shared binary package implementing standard functionality — networking, cryptography, UI elements. Applications load multiple DLLs during normal operation.
DLL injection abuses OS inter-process attachment functionality to force a legitimate process to load a malicious DLL. The attacker’s code then runs within the context of the trusted process, inheriting its privileges and evading detection.
Why it’s used: migrating malicious code into legitimate processes makes it harder for security tools to attribute the behavior to malware. The malware appears to be normal activity from a trusted process.
Indicators of DLL injection:
- Process opens unexpected network connections
- Legitimate process interacts with files or registry keys it has no reason to touch
- Parent/child process relationships that don’t match the application’s normal behavior
14. Web Application Attacks
14.1 URL and HTTP Analysis
A URL encodes both location and action. Attackers weaponize URLs by embedding malicious data in query strings, using percent encoding to obfuscate the payload.
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Legitimate:
http://trusted.foo/upload.php?post=hello
Malicious (percent-encoded payload):
http://trusted.foo/upload.php?post=%3Cscript%3D%27http%3A%2F%2F...
└── decoded: <script src='http://badsite.foo/hook.js'>
HTTP methods — know these for the exam:
| Method | Purpose | Attack Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| GET | Retrieve a resource | Parameters exposed in URL; can be logged/cached |
| POST | Send data for server processing | Form submissions; common injection vector |
| PUT | Create or replace a resource | Can be abused to upload malicious files if not restricted |
| DELETE | Remove a resource | Destructive if improperly authorized |
| HEAD | Retrieve headers only (no body) | Reconnaissance — reveals server info without full response |
HTTP response codes — key ones: 200 OK, 301/302 Redirect, 403 Forbidden, 404 Not Found, 500 Internal Server Error.
14.2 Replay Attacks and Session Hijacking
HTTP is stateless — servers maintain session state using tokens (most commonly cookies). A replay attack steals or guesses a valid token and re-submits it to hijack the session.
Cookie types:
| Type | Storage | Lifetime | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non-persistent (session) | Browser memory | Deleted when browser closes | Lower — no persistent storage |
| Persistent | Browser disk cache | Until expiry or manual deletion | Higher — survives browser restarts |
TLS limitation with cookies: TLS encrypts cookies in transit, but they reside in plaintext on the client filesystem unless separately encrypted by the application.
Session hijacking: attacker sniffs session cookies from an unencrypted network (public Wi-Fi) and uses them to impersonate the authenticated user.
Mitigations:
- Encrypt cookies in transit (HTTPS) and at rest (application-level encryption)
- Issue a new cookie on every re-authentication
- Delete cookies server-side when the user logs out
- Set short cookie expiration times
14.3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
XSS exploits the browser’s trust in a site the user has legitimately visited. The attacker injects a malicious script into content served by the trusted site; the victim’s browser executes it with the site’s privileges.
Non-persistent XSS flow:
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1. Attacker finds input validation flaw on trusted.foo
2. Attacker crafts a malicious URL embedding a script:
http://trusted.foo/search?q=<script src="https://badsite.foo/hook.js"></script>
3. Attacker delivers the URL to the victim (phishing email, malicious link)
4. Victim clicks → trusted.foo reflects the script in the response
5. Browser executes the script in the context of trusted.foo
Persistent (stored) XSS: attacker submits malicious script as content (e.g., a forum post). Every user who loads the page executes the script. No crafted URL required — the payload lives in the application’s database.
What XSS can do: steal session cookies, capture form input (keylogging), deface pages, redirect to phishing sites, install malware via drive-by download.
14.4 SQL Injection (SQLi)
Web applications query databases using SQL. If user input is passed directly into a SQL query without sanitization, an attacker can modify the query logic.
Normal query:
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SELECT * FROM tbl_user WHERE username = 'Bob'
Injected input: ' or 1=1
Resulting malicious query:
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SELECT * FROM tbl_user WHERE username = '' or 1=1
The condition 1=1 is always true — this returns every row in the table, bypassing authentication.
SQLi impact: extract data (SELECT), insert records (INSERT), delete data (DELETE), update records (UPDATE), or execute arbitrary OS commands if the DB account has sufficient privileges.
Reference: OWASP SQL Injection
15. Secure Coding Practices
15.1 Input Validation
Every input pathway into an application is a potential attack vector — form fields, URL parameters, HTTP headers, API calls, inter-process data. Input validation is the primary defense against both overflow and injection attacks.
Requirements:
- Document all input methods and reduce the attack surface where possible
- Define what valid input looks like for each field (type, length, format, range)
- Reject anything that does not conform — do not try to sanitize malformed input, reject it
- Validate on the server side — client-side validation is trivially bypassed
15.2 Secure Cookies
| Cookie Attribute | What It Does | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|
| Secure | Cookie only sent over HTTPS | Prevents transmission over unencrypted HTTP |
| HttpOnly | Cookie inaccessible to JavaScript (DOM) | Blocks XSS from stealing the cookie via document.cookie |
| SameSite | Restricts which origins can send the cookie | Mitigates Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) |
Best practices:
- Never use persistent cookies for session authentication — use session cookies
- Issue a fresh cookie on every re-authentication event
- Encrypt cookie content if it contains sensitive data
16. Cloud Deployment Models
A cloud deployment model classifies who owns and provisions a cloud service. The model matters for security because it changes the threat and vulnerability profile of the environment.
| Model | Ownership | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Public (multi-tenant) | Cloud service provider (CSP) | Offered over the internet on a subscription or pay-as-you-go basis; some tiers offered free. Shared-resource model, so performance and security are shared risks. |
| Private | The organization itself | Fully dedicated infrastructure, usually managed by one internal business unit for the rest of the organization. Greater control over privacy/security — common in banking and government where strict access control is required. |
| Community | Shared by several organizations | Multiple orgs pool costs on a hosted-private or fully private cloud to share a common concern such as standardization or compliance policy. |
17. Cloud Service Models
Cloud services are differentiated by how much of the stack the provider preconfigures for you — infrastructure, platform, or software.
| Model | What’s Provided | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) | Raw compute, storage (SAN), and networking rented on-demand instead of purchased outright | AWS EC2, Azure Virtual Machines, Oracle Cloud, OpenStack |
| PaaS (Platform as a Service) | IaaS plus a managed multi-tier application/database platform (e.g., PHP/MySQL, Oracle, MS SQL) on top | Oracle Database, Azure SQL Database, Google App Engine |
| SaaS (Software as a Service) | Fully hosted applications, accessed on a pay-as-you-go or lease basis instead of per-seat licensing | Microsoft 365, Salesforce, Google Workspace |
Exam tip: think of the three models as a stack — IaaS gives you the least preconfiguration and the most control; SaaS gives you the most preconfiguration and the least control. PaaS sits in between.
18. Virtualization and Hypervisor Types
Virtualization lets multiple operating systems run simultaneously on one physical computer. A virtual platform needs three components:
- Host hardware — the physical platform (possibly multiple hosts networked together)
- Hypervisor / Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) — manages the VM environment and mediates access to hardware/network
- Guest OS / VM / instance — the operating system running inside the virtual environment
18.1 Hypervisor Types
| Type | Also Called | Installed On | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Type I | Bare metal | Directly on the hardware — no host OS in between | VMware ESXi, Microsoft Hyper-V, Citrix XEN Server |
| Type II | Host-based / guest OS | On top of a conventional host OS | VMware Workstation, Oracle VirtualBox, Parallels Workstation |
Type I hypervisors manage hardware access directly, giving better performance and a smaller attack surface — the standard choice for production/data-center virtualization. Type II hypervisors depend on (and are constrained by) whatever host OS they run on, which is why they’re common for desktop/lab use rather than production servers.
18.2 Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) and Thin Clients
VDI provisions corporate desktops as VMs hosted centrally, accessed by low-spec thin clients that boot a minimal local OS and connect to the VM over a remote desktop protocol (Microsoft RDP, Citrix ICA).
- All application processing and data storage happens server-side; the thin client only handles display, audio, and input/output over the network.
- Centralized storage means easier backup, easier support/troubleshooting, and desktops that are easier to “lock down” — any unauthorized change can simply be overwritten by reverting to the template image.
- VDI also makes it easier for a company to fully offload IT infrastructure management to a third party.
18.3 Containers
Container virtualization skips the hypervisor entirely and enforces isolation at the OS level instead. The host OS defines isolated “cells,” each allocated its own CPU and memory, but all containers share the same underlying OS kernel. Docker is the best-known container platform.
| VMs | Containers | |
|---|---|---|
| Isolation layer | Hypervisor + separate guest OS per VM | Host OS kernel, shared across containers |
| Overhead | Higher — each VM carries a full guest OS | Lower — no per-instance guest OS |
| Attack surface consideration | Guest OS compromise is contained to that VM | A kernel-level compromise can potentially affect all containers on the host |
Exam tip: VMs virtualize hardware (each guest gets its own OS); containers virtualize the OS (each container shares the host kernel). This is the core security distinction — a container escape is more dangerous than a single VM compromise because the kernel is shared.
19. Cloud Security Controls
Cloud environments use the same categories of control as on-premises networks — identity and access management (IAM), endpoint protection for virtual instances, resource policies governing access to data/services, firewalls filtering traffic between hosts, and logging for audit. Most CSPs provide these natively (e.g., Google’s cloud firewall service), configurable via the CSP’s web console, a CLI, or an API.
19.1 Application Security and IAM
Application security in the cloud covers both the secure development process and IAM controls that ensure only authorized identities can use an application. As on-premises, cloud IAM supports user/group creation and role-based privilege management.
19.2 Secrets Management
A cloud service is highly exposed to remote access, so a failure of credential management is one of the most likely things to be exploited. Baseline requirements:
- Never use the CSP root/account-owner identity for day-to-day administrative logons — it should be reserved for account-level actions only.
- Require strong MFA for all interactive logons.
- Use conditional/adaptive authentication to deny, or flag for review, risky sign-in activity (unusual location, impossible travel, new device, etc.).
20. High Availability in the Cloud
High availability (HA) is one of the cloud’s core value propositions: resilience against failure at the component, server, local-network, site, data-center, or WAN level.
- The CSP’s virtualization layer ensures compute, storage, and network provisioning meet the availability targets defined in the SLA.
- For storage tiers specifically, “HA” typically means a guarantee of 99.99% uptime or better.
- As with on-prem architecture, the CSP achieves this through redundancy — multiple disk controllers and storage devices pooled together — and by replicating data between pools/groups, each backed by separate underlying hardware, so no single hardware failure takes the whole pool down.
21. Quick Review / Exam Cheat Sheet
Host Security Controls
| Control | What It Does | Key Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Hardening | Reduce attack surface | Balanced against usability and intended role |
| Patch management | Close known vulnerabilities | Scanning without remediation = known weakness list |
| A-V / Anti-malware | Detect known malware | Signature-based; blind to zero-days |
| HIDS | Detect intrusion via logs + file integrity | Monitors system files, ports, process logs |
| HIPS | HIDS + automated blocking | Active prevention, not just alerting |
| EPP | Single-agent platform consolidating all of the above | Avoids multi-agent conflicts and performance hit |
| DLP | Prevent unauthorized data exfiltration | Policy-driven; inspects content, not just metadata |
Mobile Deployment Models
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BYOD → employee-owned → most popular, hardest to secure
COBO → company-owned, work only → tightest control
COPE → company-owned, personal use allowed → high control + flexibility
CYOD → employee picks from approved list → like COPE, wider choice
EMM Components
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MDM = device-level policy (auth, features, remote wipe)
MAM = app-level policy (corporate container, data transfer restrictions)
EMM = MDM + MAM
Mobile Security Controls
| Control | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Screen lock + lockout policy | Deter passcode brute-force; escalating delays |
| Remote wipe / kill switch | Sanitize stolen device over the air |
| Full device encryption | Protect data if device is physically compromised |
| Data Protection (iOS) | Credential-derived encryption for email and opted-in apps |
| MDM enrollment | Enforce policy, enable remote management |
Rooting vs Jailbreaking
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Rooting → Android → exploit vuln or flash custom ROM → root access
Jailbreaking → iOS → boot patched kernel (tethered) → root + sideload
Carrier unlock → either → remove carrier lock; not full root
Application Attack Primitives
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Arbitrary code execution → attacker's code runs on target system
Remote code execution → payload delivered over the network
Privilege escalation → process runs at higher privilege than designed
Overflow Attack Summary
| Type | Mechanism | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Buffer overflow | Input exceeds reserved buffer; overwrites adjacent memory | Stack return address → redirect execution |
| Stack overflow | Specific case: overflow the call stack | Overwrite return address; inject shellcode via NOP sled |
| Memory leak | Process fails to release memory | Resource exhaustion; potential DoS |
DLL Injection Indicators
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- Legitimate process opens unexpected network connections
- Process accesses files/registry keys outside its normal scope
- Unusual parent/child process relationships
Web Attack Quick Reference
| Attack | Vector | Payload Location | Primary Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| XSS (non-persistent) | Crafted URL | Reflected in server response | Cookie theft, credential capture |
| XSS (persistent/stored) | Application content (posts, comments) | Stored in DB, served to all users | Mass cookie/credential theft |
| SQLi | Input field / URL parameter | Injected into SQL query | DB dump, auth bypass, data manipulation |
| Session hijacking | Cookie theft (sniffing) | Re-submitted token | Impersonate authenticated user |
| Replay attack | Token theft or guess | Re-submitted session token | Unauthorized session access |
SQL Injection Cheat Sheet
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-- Normal:
SELECT * FROM tbl_user WHERE username = 'Bob'
-- Injected (' or 1=1):
SELECT * FROM tbl_user WHERE username = '' or 1=1
-- 1=1 is always TRUE → returns all rows → auth bypass
Secure Cookie Attributes
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Secure → HTTPS only; blocks plaintext transmission
HttpOnly → no JavaScript access; blocks XSS cookie theft
SameSite → restricts cross-origin cookie sending; blocks CSRF
Cloud Deployment Models
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Public → CSP-owned, multi-tenant → shared risk, subscription/PAYG
Private → org-owned, dedicated → strict control (banking/gov)
Community → shared by several orgs → pooled cost + shared policy concern
Cloud Service Models
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IaaS → rent raw compute/storage/network (EC2, Azure VMs, OpenStack)
PaaS → IaaS + managed app/DB platform (Azure SQL DB, App Engine)
SaaS → fully hosted application, PAYG (Microsoft 365, Salesforce)
Hypervisor Types
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Type I (bare metal) → runs directly on hardware → ESXi, Hyper-V, XEN
Type II (host-based) → runs on top of a host OS → Workstation, VirtualBox, Parallels
VMs vs Containers
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VM → hypervisor + full guest OS per instance → heavier, stronger isolation
Container → shared host OS kernel, isolated cells → lighter, weaker isolation boundary
Cloud Security Baseline
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- Never log in as CSP root for daily admin work
- Enforce MFA on all interactive cloud logons
- Use conditional/adaptive auth for risky sign-ins
- HA storage tier ≈ 99.99%+ uptime guarantee, via redundancy + replication
Must-Know Acronyms
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A-V = Antivirus
EPP = Endpoint Protection Platform
DLP = Data Loss Prevention
HIDS = Host-based Intrusion Detection System
HIPS = Host-based Intrusion Prevention System
SCCM = System Center Configuration Manager (Microsoft)
EMM = Enterprise Mobility Management
MDM = Mobile Device Management
MAM = Mobile Application Management
BYOD = Bring Your Own Device
COBO = Corporate Owned, Business Only
COPE = Corporate Owned, Personally-Enabled
CYOD = Choose Your Own Device
AUP = Acceptable Use Policy
GPS = Global Positioning System
IPS = Indoor Positioning System (context: mobile; not Intrusion Prevention)
ROM = Read-Only Memory (context: custom ROM = custom Android firmware)
RCE = Remote Code Execution
ACE = Arbitrary Code Execution
DLL = Dynamic Link Library
NOP = No Operation (CPU instruction; used in NOP sleds for buffer overflow exploits)
URL = Uniform Resource Locator
HTTP = Hypertext Transfer Protocol
XSS = Cross-Site Scripting
SQLi = SQL Injection
SQL = Structured Query Language
CSRF = Cross-Site Request Forgery
DOM = Document Object Model
PUP = Potentially Unwanted Program
CVE = Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
OWASP = Open Web Application Security Project
CSP = Cloud Service Provider
IaaS = Infrastructure as a Service
PaaS = Platform as a Service
SaaS = Software as a Service
VMM = Virtual Machine Monitor
VM = Virtual Machine
VDI = Virtual Desktop Infrastructure
VDE = Virtual Desktop Environment
IAM = Identity and Access Management
MFA = Multifactor Authentication
HA = High Availability
SLA = Service Level Agreement
SAN = Storage Area Network
CLI = Command Line Interface
API = Application Programming Interface

